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Poor Women and the Protective State
Khiara M. Bridges
This Article puts poor, pregnant women’s current experience with the state into
conversation with the science of prenatal and early childhood brain development and
looks at the effect on women’s autonomy of government regulation of individual
behaviors that may harm fetal brain development. Drawing upon ethnographic fieldwork
with poor, pregnant women that reveals that indigent women’s current experience with the
regulatory state is one in which their autonomy is already grossly compromised, this
Article argues that the infringement on vulnerable populations’ privacy rights is
guaranteed should the government attempt to manage or reduce assaults on prenatal
brain development through the regulation of individual behaviors. Regulations that focus
on individuals should be drafted with a focus on social justice in order to protect the
autonomy of poor women affected by these laws. This Article suggests, however, that a
better approach is regulation on the macro-level—through legislation that requires
product testing and prevents manufacturers from introducing certain chemicals into the
marketplace or environment.

 Associate Professor of Law, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Boston University. J.D.,
Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Columbia University Department of Anthropology. Thanks are owed to
the participants in the Law & Policy of the Developing Brain conference for the thought-provoking
conversation, as well as to the staff members of the Hastings Law Journal for their help with this
Article.
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Research in the neurosciences has demonstrated that there are many
categories of chemicals that may adversely affect the developing brain. The
sheer ubiquity of these chemicals is staggering, and our exposure to them
seems unavoidable; indeed, they are present in everything from the food
supply to flame retardants, pesticides, jewelry upholstered furniture, and
domestic animals.1
The goal of this Article is to put poor, pregnant women’s current
experience with the state into conversation with the science of prenatal
and early childhood brain development. Specifically, this Article asks
how the autonomy of poor, pregnant women and mothers may be
impacted by government regulation of individual behaviors that may
harm fetal brain development. Based on indigent women’s current
experience with the regulatory state, the infringement on vulnerable
populations’ privacy rights is guaranteed should the government attempt
to manage or reduce assaults on prenatal brain development through the
regulation of individual behaviors. This Article suggests that the preferable
route of regulation is on the macro level—through legislation that requires
manufacturers to test their products for the neurodevelopmental hazards
they pose or else prohibits or limits the introduction of harmful chemicals
into the marketplace and the environment. If the regulatory focus is on the
individual, however, the question of social justice should be at the
forefront of drafters’ minds in order to reduce the inevitable autonomyreducing effects that it will have on poor women.
Beginning in the spring of 2005, I conducted anthropological
fieldwork for eighteen months in the obstetrics clinic of a public hospital
2
in Manhattan. Most of the women receiving prenatal care in the clinic
during that time relied upon Medicaid, specifically the New York State
Prenatal Care Assistance Program (“PCAP”), to cover the costs of their
3
healthcare. My research revealed that poor women’s current experience
with the regulatory state, as dramatized by their experience navigating
the requirements of PCAP, is one in which their autonomy is denied and
their privacy rights and expectations are presumed to be nonexistent or
negligible. There are many PCAP requirements that allow the government
access to certain intimate provinces of poor women’s lives. However, the
two requirements most relevant to the potential regulation of assaults on

1. See generally Tracey Woodruff et al., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA 240-R-03-001,
America’s Children and the Environment: Measures of Contaminants, Body Burdens, and
Illnesses (2003).
2. For an extensive analysis of my research in the Alpha obstetrics clinic, see Khiara M. Bridges,
Reproducing Race: An Ethnography of Pregnancy as a Site of Racialization (2011).
3. PCAP is a smaller program within the larger New York State Medicaid program that provides
comprehensive prenatal care services to women who would otherwise be uninsured or underinsured.
See N.Y. St. Dep’t of Health Off. of Medicaid Mgmt., Prenatal Care Assistance Program
(PCAP): Medicaid Policy Guidelines Manual (2007).
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prenatal brain development are the psychosocial assessment and the
5
nutritional assessment.
During the psychosocial assessment, a social worker screens the
patient for several “risk factors,” including: (1) The unplanned-ness and/or
unwanted-ness of the current pregnancy, (2) the woman’s intention to give
the infant up for adoption or to surrender the infant to foster care,
(3) HIV-positive status, (4) a history of substance abuse, (5) a lack of
familial or environmental support, (6) marital or family problems, (7) a
history of domestic violence, sexual abuse, or depression, (8) mental
disability, (9) a lack of social welfare benefits, (10) a history of contact
with child protective services, (11) a history of psychiatric treatment or
6
emotional disturbance, and (12) a history of homelessness. If a woman
has a risk factor, the social worker asks more searching questions about it
because the social worker has the responsibility of connecting the woman
7
with other professionals or specialists who may be able to help her.
It is an understatement to describe the psychosocial assessment as
intrusive. Even without a “risk factor,” the woman must submit to a series
of intimate questions designed to discover relevant information; with a
“risk factor,” the series of questions grows longer and more intimate. It
deserves underscoring that women in New York are led into these
conversations only when they are poor, pregnant, and seeking state8
assisted prenatal care. Wealthier women with private insurance can avoid
enduring such conversations.
During the nutritional assessment, the patient meets with a
nutritionist who records any known food or non-food allergies, documents
whether the patient has had trouble eating due to nausea or vomiting, and
provides standard information to the patient about the nutritional

4. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 85.44(d)(6) (2012) (“Providers shall conduct a
psychosocial assessment of each patient, to identify social, economic, psychological and emotional
problems which present obstacles to health and treatment. When problems are identified the
[preferred primary care provider] shall make referral, as appropriate to the patient needs, to the local
Department of Social Services, community mental health resources, alcohol and substance abuse
providers and support groups or social/psychological specialists.”).
5. Id. § 85.44(d)(7) (“The provider shall establish and implement . . . a program of nutrition
screening and counseling which includes: (i) individual nutrition risk assessment, including screening for
specific nutritional risk conditions at the initial visit and continuing reassessment as needed; [and] (ii)
professional nutrition counseling, monitoring and follow-up of all patients at nutritional risk.”).
6. Alpha Hospital Psychosocial Screening Form (on file with Author).
7. See Bridges, supra note 2, at 57.
8. See id. at 89–90 (observing that only the most savvy women can avoid the intrusiveness of the
PCAP informational canvassing, which can be done by receiving care from a healthcare provider who
accepts PCAP/Medicaid but who is not affiliated with a hospital and therefore has the discretion
(produced by the lack of institutional oversight) to ignore his legal obligation to conduct an informational
canvassing).
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requirements of pregnant women. Afterwards, the patient is asked to
10
recount what she ate for breakfast, lunch, and dinner the previous day.
She is then given an itemized food chart—for example, milk, cheese,
11
eggs, fruit, vegetables, chocolate, and candy. She is asked to circle how
many times per day or per week she consumes the foods. In the event that
the nutritionist deems the patient’s diet unsatisfactory (which appeared to
be a standard practice during my time in the clinic), she checks a box
12
labeled “inadequate/unusual dietary habits.” The patient is then asked to
make a verbal commitment to meet the nutritional needs of herself and
13
her fetus.
In many cases, the nutritional assessment is not a patient’s only
encounter with a nutritionist. If at any point during a woman’s pregnancy,
her provider feels that she has gained too much or not enough weight, she
14
must participate in additional consultations with the nutritionist. It
deserves underscoring that women in New York are only led into these
relationships of dietary surveillance when they are poor, pregnant, and
seeking state-assisted prenatal care. Wealthier women with private
insurance can avoid enduring such surveillance.
The effect of the consultations with the nutritionist and social
worker, as well as the other professionals with which pregnant women
15
must consult, is that poor women’s private lives are made available for
state surveillance and problematization. Pursuant to the PCAP mandate,
16
17
private information about women’s health and economic statuses is

9. Id. at 54.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 56–57.
15. These include a Medicaid financial officer and a nurse or health educator. See N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 85.44(c)(1)(ii) (2012) (“Facility staff shall assist the patient with
arrangements or make arrangements for the patient for off-site services, facilitate receipt of those
services, monitor reports of results of off-site services, and integrate results into patient records.”); id.
§ 85.44(d) (“The facility shall provide, directly or by contract, . . . services . . . [including] family
planning . . . and prenatal care and services.”).
16. Information about women’s health status is obtained by a registered nurse, who takes the
woman’s medical history with guidance provided by a standardized form produced by the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”): the ACOG Antepartum Record. See ACOG
Antepartum Record, Form A, available at http://forms.twobgyn.com/Forms/ACOG_Forms.pdf. ACOG is
a nonprofit organization comprised of physicians that sets standards of healthcare in the OB/GYN
specialty. See Carolyn Jacobs Chachkin, What Potent Blood: Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and
the Transformation of Modern Prenatal Care, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 9, 33–35 (2007) (noting that the
guidelines that ACOG articulates for the practices of obstetrics and gynecology frequently become the
standards of care). The ACOG Antepartum Record solicits sociological data such as birth date, age,
marital status and, interestingly, race. See ACOG Antepartum Record, supra. Moreover, it solicits
information about the woman’s history with a number of medical problems that may complicate
pregnancy and childbirth, including diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, gynecologic surgery,
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gathered and recorded. Their diets are quantified and censured. Their
histories with substance abuse, sexual abuse, public assistance, and any
19
form of contact with the state are considered significant and relevant. In
essence, a poor, pregnant woman’s privacy interest—that is, her interest
in preventing the government from intruding into her personal, intimate
affairs—has been violated.
Moreover, this invasion of poor, pregnant women’s privacy facilitates
the enduring surveillance and regulation, and potential punishment, of
poor families by the state. Subsequent to enrolling in PCAP, the state has
all the information necessary to sweep poor families within the ambit of
child protective services, the foster care system, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and, if deemed necessary, the criminal justice system.
PCAP is not unique to New York State; several other states’
Medicaid-funded prenatal care programs are similar insofar as they
require pregnant women to submit to nonmedical assessments. For
20
21
example, “nutrition services,” “health education services,” and
22
“psychosocial services” are offered to poor, pregnant women as part of
California’s Comprehensive Perinatal Services Program. This statute
makes clear what should be covered as part of health education services:
[C]urrent health practices; past experience with health care delivery
systems; prior experience with and knowledge about pregnancy, prenatal
care, delivery, postpartum self-care, infant care, and safety; client’s
expressed learning needs; formal education and reading level; learning
methods most effective for the client; educational needs related to
diagnostic impressions, problems, and/or risk factors identified by staff;
languages spoken and written; mental, emotional, or physical disabilities
that affect learning; mobility/residency; religious/cultural influences that
impact upon perinatal health; and client and family or support person’s
23
motivation to participate in the educational plan.

The statute is equally clear about psychosocial service coverage:
[C]urrent status including social support system; personal adjustment
to pregnancy; history of previous pregnancies; patient’s goals for
herself in this pregnancy; general emotional status and history; wanted
or unwanted pregnancy, acceptance of the pregnancy; substance use

anesthetic complications, and uterine anomalies. Id.
17. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
20. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 22, § 51348(c) (2012) (“A complete initial nutrition assessment shall be
performed at the initial [prenatal care] visit . . . . [and] at least once every trimester . . . . that addresses
[t]he prevention and/or resolution of nutrition problems. . . . [with the goal of] helping the patient
understand the importance of . . . maintain[ing] good nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”).
21. Id. § 51348(d).
22. Id. § 51348(e).
23. Id. § 51348(d)(2)(A).
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and abuse; housing/household; education/employment; and financial/
24
material resources.

Moreover, pregnant women must be reassessed every trimester during
25
their pregnancy and once again postpartum.
In Massachusetts, the Medicaid prenatal care program requires that
providers give health-care counseling, which includes instruction on
26
“hygiene and nutrition during pregnancy” as well as “family planning.”
Moreover, the provider is required to refer the patient to a social worker,
27
“as needed.” In Illinois, the Medicaid statute has spelled out in exacting
detail an exhaustive itemization of services that providers must give to
28
poor, pregnant women seeking prenatal care. As part of the standard
medical history that a healthcare provider asks of a patient, he must gather
information about her “social and occupational . . . background, health
29
habits, [and] previous pregnancies.” The patient must also have
counseling with respect to a wide range of issues, including physical
activity and exercise, child care arrangements, and parenting skills,
including:
meeting the physical, emotional and intellectual needs of the infant, with
specific appraisal to detect parents at risk of child abuse or
neglect[;] . . . [e]motional and social changes occasioned by the birth of a
child, including changes in marital and family relationships, the special
needs of the mother in the postpartum period, and preparing the home
for the arrival of the newborn[;] . . . postpartum family planning
30
options[; and] [o]ther relevant topics in response to patient concern.

What motivates the state’s inquiry of pregnant women? Ostensibly,
the government’s interest is in protecting the fetus and the child, once she
31
is born, from abuse or neglect. The state’s inquest and its ability to
intrude in provinces that most would describe as “private,” are based on its
parens patriae power, by which the state has authority to limit individual
32
and parental rights in order to protect children. This conflict between the
individual’s interest in protecting herself from state intervention in
personal and familial matters and the state’s interest in protecting the
24. Id. § 51348(e)(1)(A).
25. Id. § 51348(d)(2)(B), (d)(4).
26. 130 Mass. Code Regs. § 433.421(B)(5) (2012).
27. Id. § 433.421(B)(4)(c).
28. See Ill. Admin. Code tit. 77, § 630.30(b) (2011).
29. Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(A).
30. Id. § 630.30(b)(3)(L).
31. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 833, 846 (2007)
(observing that the state may intervene in the parent-child relationship in order to protect the child’s
welfare).
32. See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 31, 42–43 (2006)
(describing the concept of parens patriae as existing in tension with parental authority and noting that
the state exercises its power of parens patriae in order to “protect families’ more vulnerable
members”).
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child from the parent who raises her is an enduring, recurrent one.
While many scholars have criticized the discriminatory enforcement of
child protection laws, insofar as poor, racially-marginalized families are
34
disproportionately swept within the state’s “protective” ambit, most
scholars do not question that it is legitimate for the state to limit
35
individual and parental rights when the circumstances demand it.
With respect to pregnant women seeking state-assisted prenatal
healthcare, if the state’s inquisitive net yields information suggesting that
a woman is likely to put her fetus or child in danger, then it is more likely
that the state will keep the woman within its regulatory apparatus in order
to protect this child once it is born. The exhaustiveness of inquiries that
intrude upon spaces that most consider private might be thought necessary
because the end goal is the protection of the child. The means to that
end—the violation of poor women’s rights to privacy—is thought to be an
unfortunate, yet essential, fact.
This is the experience of poor, pregnant women with the state; their
privacy and autonomy is far more limited than the privacy of wealthier
women who do not have to rely upon the state for assistance. This leads to

33. This conflict has been explored extensively in the literature analyzing the child protective
system. See, e.g., Susan Vivian Mangold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and
Empowerment for Domestic Violence Victims and Older Children: Empowerment as Protection in the
Foster Care System, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 69, 74 (2001) (“While parents have a right to raise their
children free from state intervention, children have a countervailing right to protection from abuse
and neglect. This tension between parental rights and child protection is the key conflict in the child
protection system . . . .”). Dorothy Roberts has explored this conflict in her analysis of the
prosecutions of pregnant drug addicts. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1422 (1991)
(“[P]unishing a woman for using drugs during pregnancy pits the state’s interest in protecting the
future health of a child against the mother’s interest in autonomy over her reproductive life—interests
that until recently had not been thought to be in conflict.”).
34. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 577, 580 (1997) [hereinafter Appell, Protecting
Children] (“This essay addresses the policies, practices, and perspectives that help to fuel the growing
industry that has arisen from the state’s ‘protective’ involvement with poor families and families of
color and the state’s punitive treatment of the mothers of these families.”); Annette R. Appell, Virtual
Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 683, 770–79 (2001) [hereinafter
Appell, Virtual Mothers] (describing the predominance of poor families of color within the child
protection system); Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1225, 1244
(1999) (noting that poor women are more likely to be swept up within the ambit of child protection
systems and agencies); Sally K. Christie, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice for All,
36 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 12–15 (2003) (investigating the causes of the overrepresentation of
poor and African American children in foster care).
35. See Appell, Virtual Mothers, supra note 34, at 703 (observing that parents have the right to
raise their children without state interference unless there is proof that they are abusing or neglecting
their children); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1207, 1215 (1999) (noting that parental conduct is deferred to unless it is abusive or
neglectful).
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the question: What can we expect from laws that are motivated by
developments in neuroscience that demonstrate the potentially hazardous
effects of some behaviors on fetal brain development and that are
designed to regulate those behaviors? We can expect the state to cast an
even more exhaustive inquisitory net. We can expect the state to ask
questions about the frequency with which a woman comes into contact
with flame retardants, pesticides, certain types of jewelry, upholstered
furniture, domestic animals, and certain foods in the food supply—in
addition to the questions that the state already asks. Moreover, we can
expect that the state will maintain a supervisory, regulatory, and
occasionally punitive presence in even more poor women’s lives than at
present.
I should underscore again that while wealthier women and poor
women may engage in the same potentially harmful behaviors, the
likelihood that poor women will be “caught” doing them is greater. As law
professor Annette Appell wrote:
Poor families are more susceptible to state intervention because they
lack power and resources and because they are more directly involved
with governmental agencies. . . . [P]oor families lead more public lives
than their middle-class counterparts: rather than visiting private
doctors, poor families are likely to attend public clinics and emergency
rooms for routine medical care; rather than hiring contractors to fix
their homes, poor families encounter public building inspectors; rather
than using their cars to run errands, poor mothers use public
36
transportation.

In conclusion, we must be attuned to social justice issues should we
attempt to address the potentially hazardous effects of individual
behaviors on fetal brain development through law and legal regulation.
The better approach is a macro-level intervention: Instead of regulating
the amount of mercury-laden fish a pregnant woman eats, we ought to
regulate industries so that there is no mercury in the fish. If regulation is
at the individual level, however, there is a certain inevitability to the
disparate impact that such regulations will have on poor women. But if
this impact is on the forefront of the minds of the regulations’ drafters
then we may be able to avoid the potential damaging effects of the laws.
That may be the best that we can hope for.

36. Appell, Protecting Children, supra note 34, at 584 (footnotes omitted).

